Unemployment Insurance and Union Behavior: Comparison of Some Paradigms and Endogenous Membership by Ana Paula Martins
EERI
Economics and Econometrics Research Institute 
EERI Research Paper Series No 06/2002 
ISSN: 2031-4892 
Copyright © 2002 by Ana Paula Martins 
Unemployment Insurance and Union Behavior: Comparison 
of Some Paradigms and Endogenous Membership 
Ana Paula Martins 
EERI
Economics and Econometrics Research Institute 
Avenue de Beaulieu 
1160 Brussels 
Belgium
Tel: +322 298 8491 
Fax: +322 298 8490 
www.eeri.euUNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA PORTUGUESA
Faculdade de Ciências Económicas e Empresariais 
Unemployment Insurance and Union Behavior: 
Comparison of Some Paradigms and Endogenous Membership*
Ana Paula Martins**
Author's Address: Faculdade de Ciências Económicas e Empresariais 
UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA PORTUGUESA 
Cam. Palma de Cima 
1649-023 Lisboa - PORTUGAL 
Tel. (351-)  217214248 
E-mail:  apm@fcee.ucp.pt 
                                          
* Part of this research was presented at the Economics Department of Catholic University of Portugal 
seminar and at EALE Conference meetings at Maastricht. I am grateful for the comments made by 
participants in both seminars. 
** Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Universidade Católica Portuguesa Cam. Palma de 
Cima, 1649-023 Lisboa, Portugal. Phone: 351 217214248. Fax: 351 217270252. Email: 
apm@fcee.ucp.pt. This research started while the author was Invited Professor at Faculdade de 
Economia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa. - 2 -
ABSTRACT
Unemployment Insurance and Union Behavior: 
Comparison of Some Paradigms and Endogenous Membership 
This paper discusses the sensitivity of the labor market outcome in the standard 
bargaining paradigms - monopoly union and efficient bargaining - to the existence of a 
budget constraint pending on the financing of the unemployment benefit. 
Consequences of how the unions value members and members' status (employed 
or unemployed) in their collective maximand, implications of union having control over 
membership, and, hence, of unemployment insurance coverage, are also considered, as well 
as of different fiscal scenarios on the form of financing the unemployment benefit bill. 
JEL Classification: J51, J65, E24, H55, H39. 
Keywords: Unions, Wage Determination Models, Unemployment Benefit, 
Unemployment Insurance, Union Wage Bargaining, Union Membership. - 3 -
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Introduction.
This paper discusses some extensions of the standard union model of wage 
determination in order to analyze the existence of internal transfers among employed and 
unemployed members. The results would also apply to the case where these transfers are 
operated through the tax system. The conclusions may be adequate for Portugal, where all 
private sector employment discounts for the general unemployment fund.  
Some unions may provide payments to unemployed members; or may also bargain 
over severance pay in contract settlements. Additionally - once union internal transfers 
seem to be quite small -, it is likely that unions, especially if they engage in centralized or 
coordinated behavior, consider that the unemployment benefit is, after all, a compensation 
the burden of which falls on employed workers - obtained indirectly through taxation 1.
Moreover, particularly with centralized bargaining, the union may have the power to 
determine the size of the unemployment benefit., i.e., it has full control over the insurance 
policy. 
It is the purpose of this research to evaluate the modifications in union behavior 
implied by the inclusion of such hypothesis in the standard model. 
This analysis has been previously pursued - for the monopoly utilitarian union, see 
Oswald (1982a), Holmlund and Lundborg (1988 and 1989), and Kiander (1993) in a model 
with job search; efficient bargaining is considered by Hart and Moutos (1995), p. 110-116 
(there, the benefit rate is always exogenously determined) and right-to-manage by Booth 
(1995a); recently, Holmlund and Lundborg (1999) introduced endogenous membership. 
Most authors are interested in analyzing the impact of the unemployment benefit on the 
labor market outcome; we focus on the comparison of labor market outcomes in the several 
scenarios.
We generalize the way the implicit collective decision process values employed 
members, total membership and/or unemployed members and consider the case where the 
union can affect membership 2. We compare the labor market solution for different 
                                          
1 As noted by Calmfors and Driffill (1988). 
2 See Martins (1998) for some implications for the wage-employment mix outcome. There, 
closed-shop environment is assumed; hence, the membership function stems from labor supply. - 5 -
situations assuming a budget constraint which may or may not be recognized by either 
unions or firms and confront several fiscal schemes. 
Firstly, in section I, we analyze the simple effect of the possibility of 
compensating unemployed members under a balanced budget constraint. This has special 
relevance when there is centralized bargaining and complete coverage of wage set in 
negotiations to both union members and non-members (as is the case in Portugal). We 
compare the labor market equilibrium for three different situations: exogenous 
unemployment benefit; exogenous but recognized by the union as falling on employed 
members under a budget constraint; and, finally, endogenous unemployment benefit. 
Secondly, we consider - a sort of insider-outsider environment - the case where the 
union can choose membership size - section II. Notice that outsiders are not necessarily 
unemployed labor: with certain unemployment compensation schemes, outsiders will be 
non-members. With exogenous unemployment benefit, if union members increase, we 
expect equilibrium wages to be depressed and unemployment to rise 3. When the union can 
decide membership – for instance, it has control or bargaining power over unemployment 
insurance coverage -, the labor market outcome depends on how the union collectively 
values size, i.e., number of members – see Martins (2002); endogenous unemployment 
benefit may alter union size as well as the equilibrium wage-unemployment mix.  
Finally, we note that the labor market outcome is not independent of the form of 
financing of the unemployment compensation payment. Oswald (1982a) deals with the 
subject in the standard union model for the case of exogenous unemployment benefit level; 
he concludes that if it rises, in general, a rise in unemployment is to be expected. Holmlund 
and Lundborg (1989) explore the sensitivity of the labor market outcome to fiscal 
parameters under different financing schemes and the assumption of exogenous 
unemployment benefit. These same authors (1988) deal with union financed unemployment 
benefit bill; they conclude that an increase in unemployment benefits has an ambiguous 
effect on wages and unemployment. In some systems, only part of the unemployment 
compensation burden falls on employed members, having similar implications to profit-
sharing schemes – as noted in previous literature; then, some severance pay theory results – 
as those of Booth (1995a) - may or may not apply; also, final incidence may diverge from 
the direct taxpaying unit. This is the theme of section III. 
                                                                                                                     
Membership in or open shop has been discussed by Naylor and Cripps (1993), Booth and Chatterji 
(1993 and 1995) and Naylor and Raaum (1993), for example.  
3 This is not the case for an utilitarian union: see Oswald (1982). - 6 -
In all sections, reference is made to the result of the monopoly union problem, the 
efficient bargaining outcome and features of the solution of some special cases of the 
union’s utility function. The sign of the relation implicit in the wage bargaining curve - see 
Carlin and Soskice (1990), and empirical evidence on the wage-unemployment relation in 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) -, and its existence in this setting are also inspected 
issues.  
The modeling is kept as simple and general as possible in order to focus on the 
special mechanism in study. 
The exposition ends with a brief summary in section IV.  - 7 -
I. Internal Transfers among Union Members. 
I.1. Monopoly Union.
Take the case where union membership is exogenous and given by M. Let b 
denote the unemployment benefit and s the contribution of a working member. It is, thus, 
reasonable to assume that the utility function of the union is a function of the net wage 
received by employed members, W - s, the number of employed members, L, of the amount 
received by unemployed members, b, and the number of unemployed members, M - L. 
Eventually, union size, M, may be, per se, an argument of the utility function: 
(I.1)    U(L, W - s, M - L, b, M) 
U1 > 0 ; U2 > 0 ; U4 > 0. We also expect that U3 > 0, but not necessarily. U5 may 
be positive or negative 4. UL = U1- U3 and UM = U3 + U5; then U3 = U1- UL = UM - U5.
As a monopoly union, it maximizes its utility function constrained by labor 
demand, that determines employment, L = L(W), with slope LW < 0 and inverse form 
related to the value of marginal product of labor, P FL(L) = W, where P denotes the output 
price level. 
Model I. If internal transfers are unavailable or if the unemployment benefit 
mechanism is ignored – i.e. if b and s are seen as exogenous and unrelated -, then we 
observe that F.O.C., involving only optimization of: 
(I.2)    Max  U[L, W - s, M - L, b, M] 
             L, W 
    s.t.:      L = L(W) 
that would lead to the general solution 5:
(I.3)   U1 LW + U2 - U3 LW  =  0      or       (U1 - U3) LW  =  - U2
                                          
4 See Martins (1998) for considerations on the subject.
5 We will always assume that SOC hold around it.  - 8 -
Once LW < 0 and U2 > 0, in the interior solution U1 > U3.
Model II.  An equilibrium budget constraint requires that: 
(I.4)    b (M - L) = L s      or       b u = (1-u) s 
where u = (M - L) / M denotes the unemployment rate. If the monopoly union 
cannot control s nor b but recognizes the budget constraint, it will solve: 
(I.5)    Max  U[L, W - s, M - L, s L / (M - L), M] 
             L, W 
    s.t.:      L = L(W) 
F.O.C. originate: 
(I.6)   U1 LW + U2 - U3 LW + U4 LW M s / (M - L)2 = 0 
Given that LW is negative, and U4 > 0, for the same levels of b and the optimal 
solution (L*, W* and implicit u* and s) of (I.3), i.e., of Model I, the left hand-side of (I.6) 
is negative - utility is already decreasing. This means that, regardless of the sign of U3, we 
expect the wage to be higher - employment lower - if there is a failure from the part of the 
union to recognize the budget constraint 6. Intuitively, this would be the expected result: if 
the burden of the unemployment insurance bill is recognized as feedbacking to employed 
labor, the union will try to reduce it to some extent, cutting back on wages and hence, 
unemployment. 
Model III. Finally, assume the union can also control the unemployment benefit, 
or an equivalent severance payment, b - and, through the budget constraint, s. Then the 
union solves: 
                                          
6 The left hand-side of (I.6) by SOC decreases with W, and it is negative at the wage level 
satisfying (I.3); hence, to restore equality to 0 W must decrease relative to that level.  - 9 -
(I.7)    Max  U[L, W - s, M - L, s L / (M - L), M] 
           L, W, s 
    s.t.:      L = L(W) 
F.O.C. originate (I.6) and: 
(I.8)   -  U2 + U4 L / (M - L) = 0    or    U2 - U4 L / (M - L) = 0     and 
          U2 / U4 = L / (M - L) = (1 - u) / u 
Consider the s chosen by the government and the wage set in (I.6) in Model II.
For such solution, if U2 < U4 L / (M - L), we expect s chosen by the union to be now 
higher. Also, for the s, W and L of Model II, and again if U2 < U4 L / (M - L): 
(I.9)   U1 LW + U2 - U3 LW + U4 LW M s / (M - L)2 < 
<  U1 LW - U3 LW + U4 [L / (M - L) + LW M s / (M - L)2]   
The right hand-side is – once the left hand-side is zero -, positive at the solution of 
Model II. As it must equal zero for an internal solution of Model III, we expect wages to 
be higher than in Model II. That is, if s imposed by the government – in Model II - was 
low compared to what the union wants to set, wages and unemployment (and s) will be 
higher 7 – and b will also be higher 8.
Conversely, if s set by the government is larger than the one that would have been 
chosen by the union, the wage chosen by the union will likely be lower when s and b 
become endogenous. 
This result can be explained as follows: if the union prefers or sets a higher s – or 
b -, net wages will decrease; to compensate workers, it must raise gross wages, and will 
have to cope with higher unemployment. 
                                          
7 Provided 2U[L, W - s, M - L, s L / (M - L), M] / W s > 0. Around the solution of (I.6), 
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8 For the budget constraint to hold, (1-u) db = u ds + (s * b) du; if du, ds  0, then db  0. - 10 -
If in the optimal solution the union’s marginal utility derived from employed and 
unemployed members is the same, i.e., U1 = U3 - say, that individually they have the same 
weight in the collective decision of the union - then, because from (I.8), we arrive, from 
(I.6), at the expression: 
(I.10) L,W = u W / s = (1-u) W / b 
 or W  =  L,W s / u =  L,W b / (1-u) 
where L,W denotes the (absolute value of the) wage-elasticity of the demand for 
labor. If b is fixed primarily by the union, we observe a positively sloped wage bargaining 
curve – from W = L,W b / (1-u), and (for constant L,W) W/u > 0; however, it is 
arguable that (I.10) yields the bargained real wage curve, once b is endogenous. In net 
wages: 
(I.11)    W - s = b (L,W - u) / (1-u) =  s (L,W - u) / u 
Employed members will be better-off than unemployed members iff L,W > 1. In 
this case, (W-s)/u > 0 (positively sloped net wage bargaining curve). 
I.2. Efficient Bargaining.
Model I. Consider the traditional model. The efficient contract locus can be 
obtained from 9
                                          
9 See Earle and Pencavel (1990) - the "canonical bargaining form". The Nash maximand 
solution 
     Max  [U(L,W) - U;
_
] [(L,W) - ;
_
]
   L,  W 




 for the 
parties involved, would complicate some of the mathematics - and gives the same efficient 
combinations (L,W).  corresponds to the ratio of the firm discount rate to the union’s discount rate, 
and will, therefore, be higher the higher the relative bargaining power of the union. See Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman (1991), for example. - 11 -
(I.12)     Max   U[L, W-s, M-L, b, M] + B [P F(L) - W L] 
   L,  W 
F.O.C. originate: 
(I.13)  U1 - U3 + B (P FL - W) = 0 
(I.14)  U2 - B L = 0 
The efficient contract locus will be on: 
(I.15)  (U1 - U3) / U2 =  (W - P FL) / L 
In this case, if U1 = U3, the contract curve coincides with labor demand. 
Model II. If the budget constraint is recognized by the union, then: 
(I.16)     Max   U[L, W-s, M-L, sL/(M-L), M] + B [P F(L) - W L] 
   L,  W 
F.O.C. originate (I.14) and: 
(I.17)  U1 - U3 + U4 M s / (M - L)2 + B (P FL - W) = 0 
The efficient contract locus will be: 
(I.18)  [U1 - U3 + U4 M s / (M - L)2] / U2  =  (W - P FL) / L     or 
   [U1 - U3 + U4 b / (u L)] / U2  =  (W - P FL) / L  
As long as U4 is positive, the contract curve is expected to be to the right of (I.15) 
in space (L,W). It is straightforward to see it for U1 = U3; then, W > P FL, i.e., the contract 
curve will be to the right of the labor demand schedule – the contract curve of Model I.
The recognition of the budget constraint leads to an outward shift of the contract curve and 
a demand for higher wages at previously level of bargained employment. - 12 -
Model III. If the union can control the unemployment benefit, it solves 
(I.19)      Max  U[L, W-s, M-L, sL/(M-L), M] + B [P F(L) - W L] 
   L,  W,  s 
F.O.C. originate (I.14), (I.17) and (I.8) of the monopoly union problem: 
(I.20)  -  U2 + U4 L / (M - L) = 0 
Given that (I.20) - reproducing (I.8) - holds, the efficient locus will be such that 
(I.21)   (W - P FL) / L = (U1 - U3) / U2 + s / (L u) 
If, again, in the optimal solution U1 = U3:
(I.22)    W - P FL =  s / u = b / (1-u) 
In net wages: 
(I.23)    W - s  - P FL = b = s (1 - u) / u 
An implication is that, regardless of form of the utility function, provided that U1
= U3, and that in the final outcome P FL > 0, employed members are necessarily better-off 
than unemployed, i.e., W - s > b. 
Proposition 1. If the unemployment benefit budget constraint is recognized by the 
union: 
1. The monopoly union wage is lower than if the budget constraint is ignored by 
the union. 
2. If in the optimal solution the union’s marginal utility derived from employed 
and unemployed members is the same, the contract curve will lie to the right of labor 
demand, the contract curve when the budget constraint is not recognized by the union. - 13 -
Proposition 2. If internal transfers are available or the unemployment benefit is 
seen as controlled by the union and financed by union members: 
1. When the unemployment benefit level chosen by the government is lower than 
the unions´s choice, the monopoly union wage is higher and employment lower when its 
level becomes endogenous and conversely. 
2. If in the optimal solution the union’s marginal utility derived from employed 
and unemployed members is the same: 
2.1. monopoly union will originate: 
 W  =  L,W s / u = L,W b / (1-u)      and 
  W - s   =  s (L,W - u) / u  =  b (L,W - u) / (1-u)  
Unemployed members will be better-off than employed members, i.e., W - s < b, 
iff  L,W < 1. The net wage bargaining curve will be negatively sloped in that case, but 
will be positively sloped if L,W > 1. 
2.2. in the efficient bargaining locus: 
  W - P FL = s / u = b / (1-u)        and 
  W - s  - P FL = b = s (1 - u) / u 
In this case, unemployed members will never be better-off than employed 
members, i.e., W - s  b - as long as P FL  0. The bargaining curve will be positively 
sloped. 
I.3. A Special Case.
Consider the widely used utilitarian union - u(.) denotes the utility of a member, 
increasing and concave in its argument, net income from labor - that maximizes: 
(I.24)    L u(W-s) + (M - L) u(b) 
Then, U1 = u(W-s);  U2 = L u´(W-s); U3 = u(b); U4 = (M - L) u'(b); and U5 = 0. 
A. Exogenous Membership.
1. Take the monopoly union. 
Model I. If internal transfers are unavailable or if the unemployment benefit 
mechanism is ignored then, we observe that F.O.C., involving only optimization in L and 
W of: - 14 -
(I.25)     Max   L u(W-s) + (M - L) u(b) 
   L,  W 
    s.t.:      L = L(W)   
F.O.C. originating the well-known solution 
(I.26)    L(W) u´(W-s) + [u(W-s) - u(b)] LW = 0 
For an interior solution u(W-s) > u(b) - that is, U1 > U3 - and unemployed 
members will be worse-off than employed ones: W - s > b which implies W (1 - u) > b. 
Model II. Then the union solves: 
(I.27)     Max   L u(W-s) + (M - L) u[s L/(M-L)]  
   L,  W 
    s.t.:      L = L(W)   
F.O.C. generate: 
(I.28)    L(W) u´(W-s) + [u(W-s) - u(b)] LW + (s / u) u´(b) LW = 0 
At the solution that satisfies (I.26), (I.28) is negative: wages will be lower than if 
the budget constraint was not recognized. 
Model III. Then the union solves: 
(I.29)      Max   L u(W-s) + (M - L) u[s L/(M-L)]  
   L,  W,  s 
    s.t.:      L = L(W)   
F.O.C. originate (I.28) and: 
(I.30)    - L u´(W-s) +  L u´[s L/(M-L)] = 0 - 15 -
From here we conclude that in the optimal solution the utility of employed and 
unemployed members will be the same. Notice that then, U1 = U3 and W -s = b. Therefore: 
(I.31)    W = s / u      or      W = b / (1-u) 
Also, if s chosen by the union is larger than the one set by the government in 
Model II, (I.28) is negative at the b, u and W of Model III and s set by the government in 
II; the maximand of Model II is already decreasing. The wage chosen by the union in 
Model III is higher than if it cannot control b. 
The wage/unemployment relation (with b) will be positive for unions that choose 
the same unemployment compensation. 
Rearranging the expression /W = 0, where  denotes the objective function 
where labor demand has been incorporated (or considering that when U1 = U3, (I.10) 
holds), we arrive at 
(I.32)  L,W = 1 
Recall that is the solution of the monopoly union that maximizes the wage bill W 
L, and this solution is what we would expect in an utilitarian environment with income 
transfers among members 10.
2. Consider now efficient bargaining. 
Model I. If internal transfers are unavailable or if the unemployment benefit 
mechanism is ignored then, we observe the traditional case, involving only optimization in 
L and W of: 
(I.33)      Max   L u(W-s) + (M - L) u(b)+ B [P F(L) - W L] 
     L, W 
F.O.C. originate: 
                                          
10 An analogous result is advanced in McDonald and Solow (1981) when they analyze an 
union as a "commune". They consider an utilitarian union - see special case below - where employed 
members have disutility from work. - 16 -
(I.34)    u(W-s) - u(b) + B (P FL - W) = 0 
(I.35)    L u´(W-s) - B L = 0 
from which we can derive the standard contract curve: 
(I.36)    [u(W-s) - u(b)] / u´(W-s)  =  W - P FL
Then U1  U3 iff W  P FL (i.e., as long as the wage is larger than on the labor 
demand schedule - the contract curve is to the right of labor demand - on space (L, W)). In 
the optimal solution, then, u(W-s)  u(b) and employed members will be better-off than 
unemployed ones. 
Notice that (I.35) determines W - s 11:
(I.37)    u´(W - s)  = B  
Ex-post, s is subject to the budget constraint and we can write that u´[W - b u / (1 - 
u)]  = B. For fixed B, and b, which is exogenous in this case, W increases with the 
unemployment rate. 
Model II. If internal transfers are available and the unemployment benefit is 
exogenously determined: 
(I.38)     Max   L u(W-s) + (M - L) u[s L/(M-L)] + B [P F(L) - W L] 
   L,  W 
F.O.C. originate (I.35) and: 
(I.39)    u(W-s) - u[s L/(M-L)] + u´[s L/(M-L)] sM/(M-L) + B (P FL - 
W) = 0 
                                          
11 Again, recall that this result derives from the form of the canonical bargaining problem - 
but not the efficient bargaining locus. Nevertheless, (I.36) would hold if the standard Nash 
maximand was used instead. - 17 -
For the W* of Model I, defined by (I.35), and L* that guarantees (I.34), the left 
hand-side of (I.39) is positive, implying a higher level of employment for that same wage 
level in Model II, when the budget constraint is recognized. Then we conclude that the 
contract curve shifts to the right. 
Again, (I.37) holds. The contract curve will be given by: 
(I.40)    [u(W-s) - u(b) + u'(b) b / M] / u´(W-s)  =  W - P FL
In the interior solution, U1 may be larger or smaller than U3 if W  P FL. If 
U1 = U3, then 
(I.41)    b / M = W - P FL       or      s / M = (W - P FL) u / (1 - u) 
Model III. Finally, if the union has control over the unemployment benefit, it 
solves:
(I.42)      Max   L u(W-s) + (M - L) u[s L/(M-L)] + B [P F(L) - W L] 
    L, W, s 
F.O.C. give rise to (I.35), (I.39) and: 
(I.43)    - L u´(W-s) + L u´[s L/(M-L)] = 0 
We derive that, because U1 = U3, (I.22) and (I.23) hold, and, once (I.31) holds:  
(I.44)   P FL = 0 
Again, it corresponds to the efficient locus of the wage bill maximizer union, 
which is vertical in L(0) = L*; and u* = (M - L*) / M. So, using (I.31), efficient bargaining 
originates:
(I.45)    s = u* W  ;  b = (1 - u*) W 
Whatever the wage set in the negotiations, the unemployment benefit and the tax 
deduction will be proportional to it. - 18 -
Notice that (I.35) and (I.43) originate: 
(I.46)    u´(W - s) = u´(b) = B 
Therefore, b = W-s depends on the form of u(.) and the size of B 12, with - 
because u(.) is concave -  
(I.47)    db*/dB < 0. 
The level of the unemployment benefit varies negatively with the employers 
relative strength. 
3. Suppose that apart from internal transfers unemployed union members receive 
also a compensation W0 - for example, apart from internal transfers among union members 
the public sector provides a compensation of that amount, the members not employed in the 
union get this wage for a temporary nonunion job, or that level represents the money value 
of leisure "consumed" by unemployed members -, i.e., we can write the union’s utility 
function as: 
(I.48)    L u(W-s) + (M - L) u[s L/(M-L) + W0]
Admit a monopoly union context and consider only the version of Model III. The 
optimal solution is such that U1 = U3 and (I.28) is replaced by: 
(I.49)  W  -  W0 = s / u = b / (1-u)    or 
   W  =  W0 + s / u = W0 + b / (1-u) 
and (I.32) by: 
(I.50) L,W = W / (W - W0)
    or  W = W0 / (1 - 1/L,W)
                                          
12 Again, we would expect, however (I.45) to hold if the standard Nash maximand was used 
instead. - 19 -
So, the utilitarian monopoly union will pick the same solution as the rent 
maximizer, i.e., the union that maximizes (W - W0) L. Using (I.49) and (I.50) we can 
derive: 
(I.51)  s  =  W0 u / (L,W - 1)  and 
   b  =  W0 (1-u) / (L,W - 1) 
The unemployment compensation, b, varies negatively with the unemployment 
rate and the wage-elasticity of demand. It varies positively with W0.
For the efficient bargaining solution, (I.22) is replaced by: 
(I.52)    W - P FL  =  s / u = W - W0
and 
(I.53)  P  FL = W0
It corresponds to the efficient locus of the rent maximizer union, which is vertical 
in L(W0) = L*; and u* = (M - L*) / M. So, using (I.53), efficient bargaining originates: 
(I.54)    s = u* (W - W0)  ;  b = (1-u*) (W - W0)
B. Endogenous Membership.
1. Consider that M = M(W, b, s, u) and again, Model III. Notice that a potential 
member may look at the expected wage and take into account the budget constraint - his 
expected wage will be W(1-u). He might then have M = M[W (1-u)], which allows us to 
derive M = M(W, L). For simplicity we may assume that M = M(W) 13, with MW > 0. 
(I.55)        Max   L u(W-s) + (M - L) u[s L/(M-L)]  
    M, L, W, s 
    s.t.:      L = L(W)  ;  M = M(W)   
                                          
13 For further developments and insights on this function see Martins (1998). - 20 -
Again, denoting by  the objective function where both restrictions have been 
replaced, from /s = 0,  
(I.56)    W = s / u    ;     b = W - s = s L/(M - L) = s (1 - u ) / u 
We will have also, from /W = 0, that: 
(I.57)    L u´(b) + LW u´(b) b M / L + MW [u(b) - b u´(b)] = 0 
If for the solution corresponding to the exogenously considered M problem, u(b) - 
b u´(b) > 0 - i.e., the elasticity of members utility u(.) with respect to its argument in the 
optimal solution is smaller than one -, for the same b, the wage will be higher when 
membership is endogenous, and lower if the opposite occurs. 
2. The efficient contract solution yields: 
(I.58)    (W - P FL) / L = u´(b) b (M / L) /{L u´(b) + MW [u(b) - b 
u´(b)]}   or 
   W  -  PFL = u´(b) b M /{L u´(b) + MW [u(b) - b u´(b)]} 
If individuals are risk neutral and u(W) = W, then we achieve the same solution 
for both problems as with exogenous membership (provided internal solutions allow L > M 
in the optimal solution). 
Summarizing: 
Proposition 3. If internal transfers are available or the unemployment benefit is 
seen as controlled by an utilitarian union and financed by union members: 
1. Regardless of the form of the utility function of its members, the union will pick 
the wage/employment solution: 
- of the wage bill maximizer union if there is no exogenous alternative 
(complementary) compensation in case of unemployment (i.e., L,W = 1 for the monopoly 
union solution; P FL = 0 in efficient bargaining). - 21 -
- of the collective rent maximizer union if there is an exogenous complementary 
compensation W0 in case of unemployment (i.e., W = W0 /(1 - 1/L,W) for the monopoly 
union solution; P FL = W0 in efficient bargaining). 
2. In the optimal solution, members´ utility (of employed and unemployed 
members) is equalized 14.
3. With endogenous membership, and assuming that membership demand 
responds positively to the wage set in union negotiations, if the elasticity of members utility 
is smaller than one, the wage chosen is higher than in the case where membership is taken 
as exogenous. 
                                          
14 2. has been noticed by Oswald (1982). - 22 -
II. Internal Transfers and Optimal Membership. 
II.1. Monopoly Union.
1. Assume the previous general problem of Model III. If the union can also set 
membership - through, say, membership fees; or has bargaining power over coverage of 
unemployment insurance -, i.e., if it faces the problem 
(II.1)   Max  U[L, W - s, M - L, s L / (M - L), M] 
        L, M, W, s 
    s.t.:      L = L(W) 
F.O.C. will require (I.6) and (I.8) to hold, as well as: 
(II.2)   U3 - U4 s L / (M - L)2 + U5 = UM - U4 s L / (M - L)2  = 0 
This condition holds in Model II as well, but for Model I, it is replaced by UM = 
0. This suggests, as expected, that when the budget constraint, for exogenous level of b, is 
realized by the union – the left hand-side of (II.2) becomes negative at the previous optimal 
solution –, membership set by the union decreases. 
If we have the settings of Model II, (I.6) holds as before; provided U1, U2, U3
and U4 do not change much with M, as M / (M - L)2 decreases with M, we conclude that if 
union membership is higher than the level the union would choose, wages are higher when 
membership is endogenized and restricted – the left hand-side of (I.6) is positive at 
previous W* and new M. Say, if unions gain control over the unemployment insurance 
coverage – but not over the benefit level -, we expect to see coverage move in the opposite 
direction to wages. 
2. Assume that instead the union maximizes U/M 15. Then, (I.6) and (I.8) still 
hold. (II.2) is now replaced by: 
(II.3)   [U3 - U4 s L / (M - L)2 + U5] M - U = 0 
                                          
15 This point was made in Martins (1998). - 23 -
M* is, therefore smaller than in the previous case. 
II.2. Efficient Bargaining.
The efficient bargaining solution will yield the same configuration as in section I, 
requiring additionally that (II.2) holds in the case where U is maximized and (II.3) in the 
case in which U/M is maximized. 
II.3. Special Cases.
1. Take a union that maximizes an utility function which has an utilitarian part and 
also a membership argument in the following way 
(II.4)   Max   L u(W-s) + (M - L) u[s L/(M-L)] + G(M) 
        M, L, W, s 
    s.t.:      L = L(W) 
F.O.C. originate (I.28) and (I.30) as before and: 
(II.5)   u[s L/(M-L)] - u´[s L/(M-L)] s L/ (M-L) + GM = 0 
GM may be positive or negative, but we assume concavity of G(.) – which favors 
S.O.C.
The monopoly union is going to obey the same principles as the example of the 
previous section 16; (I.31) holds and the optimal hiring (and wage, W*) level, L*, are the 
same as of the wage bill maximizer, i.e., we get that the choice corresponds to the solution 
where L,W = 1, (I.32). 
Using the maximization condition with respect to M, 
(II.6)   u(b) + GM - b u´(b) = 0     or     GM = b u´(b) - u(b) 
                                          
16 Oswald (1982) points out that with an utilitarian union, wages of the monopoly union 
setting are independent of the number of members. - 24 -
Notice that if GM = 0, say, we have a pure utilitarian union, this expression gives 
us b* 17. If not, (II.6) will originate  
(II.7)   b = b (M) 
and b(M) will be such that 
(II.8)   GMM  dM  =  b u”(b)  db 
Given that G and u are concave, in b(M) 
(II.9)   db/dM > 0 
The unemployment benefit will increase with union size. From (II.7) and the 
budget constraint, we can obtain M from. 
(II.10)  b(M) M = W* L*. 
s and u are straightforwardly obtained. 
The efficient bargaining solution comes from: 
(II.11)  Max   L u(W-s) + (M - L) u[s L/(M-L)] + G(M) + 
        M, L, W, s    + B [P F(L) - W L] 
F.O.C. give rise to (I.35), (I.39) and (I.43) and (II.5). We derive (I.45) and (I.44) - 
P FL = 0 -: in the optimal contract, L = L* that maximizes employment.  
(II.5) and b = b(M) is indistinguishable from the relation found for the monopoly 
union (II.6). Technically, b* is set according to (I.46), u´(b) = B. b, and therefore M - M is 
determined according to b = b(M) -, will be higher the lower is B (the employer relative 
bargaining strength). Given L*, u* is determined, and, with b*, s*. W* = s*/u*. 
                                          
17 Consider for example u(c) = (c - c0)	. Then b* = c0 /(1-	).- 25 -
2. If we have a pure utilitarian union, we will have a corner solution because u´(b) 
= B determines b and also (II.7)... 
3. Suppose the union maximizes average utility of members U/M. Then 
employment and wage are going to be the same as in the wage bill maximizer. M will be 
lower than if U was maximized and therefore the unemployment rate will be lower - 
because (I.45) holds, s will be lower and b higher. (II.6) will be replaced by: 
(II.12) [u(b)  +  GM - b u´(b)] = U / M 
The left hand-side is, thus, positive, which - because GMM < 0 and u”(b) < 0 - is 
consistent with the statements of the previous paragraph. 
Proposition 4. 1. If membership is unilaterally decided by the union, 2. of 
Proposition 2., 1., 2. and 3. of Proposition 3. hold. 
2. A monopoly union that has no control over the unemployment benefit level but 
recognizes the budget constraint, if it gains control over membership, it increases wages as 
it lowers membership and conversely. 
3. A monopoly union that has no control over the unemployment benefit level but 
can control membership or coverage, when it recognizes the budget constraint, it decreases 
membership. 
4. If the union’s utility function has the properties of (II.4) and the union can 
decide membership, we expect to observe that the unemployment benefit increases with 
union size or membership. In efficient bargaining, both will decrease with the employers´ 
relative strength. 
5. When the utilitarian union maximizes average utility, the wage and employment 
levels chosen will be the same as in the case where the union maximizes total utility. 
However 18, the membership chosen is smaller (therefore, also unemployed members) than 
if total utility was maximized. 
                                          
18 This second point was made in Martins (1998). - 26 -
III. Distribution of the Unemployment Compensation Burden. 
In this section we present some generalizations of Models II and III. Consider 
that only a share of the tax burden is paid by the working members. Let s 
 L, 0 
  1, be 
the share paid by working members. Firms have to pay  s (1-
) L. 
III.1. Earnings or Employment Tax.
Consider this tax assumes for firms the form of a proportional tax on L, (or firms 
endogenize this recognition) i.e.: 
(III.1)  P F(L) - W L – s (1-
) L = P F(L) - [W + s (1-
)] L 
The firm’s demand for labor will thus have the configuration such that: 
(III.2)  L = L[W + s (1-
)] 
Rewriting the monopoly union problem (for Model II), 
(III.3)   Max  U[L, W - s 
, M - L, s L / (M -L), M] 
           L, W 
    s.t.:      L = L[W + s (1-
)] 
F.O.C. originate: 
(III.4) U1 LW + U2 - U3 LW + U4 LW M s / (M - L)2 = 0 
Consider the union is able to determine s - that is, the environment of Model III.
Then, also 
(III.5) U1(1-
) LW - 
 U2 + U3 (1-
)L W +
 +  U4 L / (M - L) + U4 (1-
) LW M s / (M - L)2  = 0 
With (III.4), this yields that - 27 -
(III.6) U4 L / (M - L) = U2
This means that the typical solution is equal to the one depicted in section I, i.e., 
let W* be the solution for 
 = 1. Say the union chooses W and s such that 
(III.7)  W* = W + s (1-
)
Then demand by firms, L, in the optimal solution will be the same. As, because of 
(III.7),  
(III.8)  W* - s = W - s 
   
the same s as before will satisfy the F.O.C. (III.4) and (III.5). 
Consider the union cannot choose s but can bargain over 
. Then, F.O.C. require 
(III.4) and: 
(III.9) -  [U1 LW + U2 - U3 LW + U4 LW M s / (M - L)2 ] s = 0 
The union will be again indifferent – now to the size of 
, once (III.9) is 
equivalent (III.4). 
We conclude, therefore that the union is indifferent to the distribution of the tax 
burden if it is seen as a tax proportional to employment - firms reaction through demand 
implies we arrive at the same solution and final incidence is the same; there is only a switch 
from wage to the payment of employed members. 
It is straightforward to show that the same conclusions hold for the efficient 
bargaining locus. 
III.2. Lump-Sum Tax.
Now, let us say the share paid by the firms is obtained through a lump-sum tax. 
Then, labor demand is independent of s and 
, i.e., L = L(W). - 28 -
III.2.A. Monopoly Union. 
Then, the union solves (Model II):
(III.10)   Max  U[L, W - s 
, M - L, s L / (M -L), M] 
           L, W 
    s.t.:      L = L(W) 
F.O.C. give 
(III.11) U1 LW + U2 - U3 LW + U4 LW M s / (M - L)2 = 0 
If of the five partial derivatives of U only U2 depends on 
, and U is concave, the 
left hand-side of (III.11) will increase with 
. This means that a rise in 
, the share paid by 
workers, will raise gross wages and decrease employment 19.
Consider the union is able to determine s - the generalization of Model III. Then, 
also
(III.12) U4 L / (M - L) = 
 U2
If in the optimal solution U1 = U3, then: 
(III.13) L,W = u W / s 
 = (1-u) W / b 
        or 
   W  =  L,W s 
 / u = L,W b 
 / (1-u)  
In net wages: 
(III.14) W  -  
 s = 
 b (L,W - u) / (1 - u) = 
 s (L,W-u) / u 
                                          
19 This reproduces the findings of Holmlund and Lundborg (1988): they report that a tax on 
profits to finance the u.b. bill, equivalent to a shift of the payment to firms, increases employment. - 29 -
Employed members will be better-off than unemployed members iff 
 > (1-u) / 
(L,W - u). The reverse will happen necessarily if L,W < 1: unemployed members will 
be better-off than employed members.  
Needless to say, if the union could also pick 
, it would choose 0. 
III.2.B. Efficient Bargaining. 
The efficient contract locus in the generalization of Model III can be obtained 
from 
(III.15)  Max  U[L, W - 
 s, M - L, s L / (M-L), M] + B [P F(L) - W L] 
           L, W, s 
F.O.C. originate: 
(III.16) U1 - U3 + U4 M s /(M - L)2 + B (P FL - W)= 0 
(III.17) U2 - B L = 0 
(III.18) -  
 U2 + U4 L / (M - L) = 0 
Therefore 
(III.19)  (W - P FL) / L = (U1 - U3) / U2 + 
 s / (L u) 
If, again, in the optimal solution U1 = U3, then 
(III.20)  W - P FL =  
 s / u = 
 b / (1 - u)  
In net wages: 
(III.21) W  -  
 s  - P FL = 
 b = 
 s (1 - u) / u 
An implication is that in the optimal solution, regardless of form of the utility 
function, if U1 = U3, employed members will only be better-off than unemployed members 
iff  P FL > (1 - 
) b. - 30 -
III.2.C. Special Case. 
1. Consider an utilitarian union that maximizes 
(III.22)     Max   L u(W- 
 s) + (M - L) u[s L/(M-L)]  
   L,  W,  s 
    s.t.:      L = L(W)   
Denoting by  the objective function where the restriction has been replaced, 
F.O.C. originate, from /s = 0,  
(III.23) -  L  
 u´(W- 
 s) +  L u´[s L/(M-L)] = 0 
For the optimal W (L and s) of the problem with 
 = 1, (III.23) will now be 
positive, suggesting that a higher s should correspond to the optimum when 
 decreases. 
Also, in the optimal solution the marginal utility of employed members will be 




 s) = u´[s L/(M-L)] = u´(b) 
Therefore, employed members have lower utility than unemployed members: 
(III.25) W-  
 s  <  s L/(M-L)  = b 
Therefore: 
(III.26)  W  <  s [1 - (1-
) u] / u  <  s / u  
  or  W  <  b [1 - (1-
) u] / (1-u)  <  b / (1-u) 
From /W = 0, 
(III.27) L  u´(W-  
 s) + LW {u(W- 
 s) - u[s L/(M-L)] } + 
    +   L W u´[s L/(M-L)] s M/(M-L) = 0 - 31 -
Considering (III.24) and (III.25) we conclude that in the optimal solution 
(III.28)  W  <  s 
 L,W / u  =  b 
 L,W / (1-u)  
wages and unemployment would probably - but we could not prove that 
necessarily - be smaller than when 
 = 1. 
2. The efficient bargaining solution will result in 
(III.29) u(W-  
 s) - u[s L/(M-L)] + u´[s L/(M-L)] s M/(M-L) = B (W - P FL)
(III.30) L  u´(W-  
 s) - B L = 0 
(III.31) -  
 L u´(W- 
 s) + L u´[s L/(M-L)] = 0 
From (III.30) we get that 
(III.32) u´(W-  
 s) = B  
Therefore, in efficient bargaining, employed members net earnings are solely 
determined by B - and negatively related with it - and the shape of members utility 
function. It is invariant to the value of 
. Using (III.31) and (III.32): 
(III.33)  
 u´(W- 
 s) = 
 B = u´[s L/(M-L)] = u´(b) 
The lower 
, (the lower u´(b)) the higher b*: The lower the share paid by the 
unions, the more they will be willing to choose a high benefit level. As in the monopoly 
union solution: 
(III.34) W-  
 s  <  s L/(M-L) = b 
and 
(III.35)  W  <  s [1-(1-
)u] / u  <  s/u  
  or  W  <  b [1-(1-
)u] / (1-u)  <  b/(1-u) - 32 -
III.3. Proportional Profit Tax.
Consider the share paid by the firms is obtained through a proportional profit tax. 
We have two possible cases: either the firms do or do not recognize the budget constraint: 
(III.36)  t [P F(L) - W L]  = s (1 - 
) L 
III.3.A. Monopoly Union.
1. If firms do not recognize the budget constraint, if capital is not involved - or, in 
the short-run when capital is fixed -, labor demand is independent of s and 
, i.e., L = L(W) 
still holds. This means that the monopoly union problem will be the same as in III.2.A. In 
the long run, demand may decline - once K decreases and also the labor marginal product is 
expected to fall. 
2. If the firms recognize (III.36), it is easy to show that we have a similar situation 
to the earnings tax problem. 
III.3.B. Efficient Bargaining.
1. If firms do not recognize the budget constraint, the efficient bargaining 
problem, becomes: 
(III.37)  Max  U[L, W - 
 s, M - L, s L / (M-L), M] + B (1 - t) [P F(L) - W L] 
            L, W, s 
Then the solution works as in the lump-sum tax problem with B replaced by (1 - t) 
B. For the special case of the utilitarian union: 
(III.38) u(W-  
 s) - u[s L/(M-L)]  
    + u´[s L/(M-L)] s M/(M-L) = (1 - t) B (W - P FL)
(III.39) L  u´(W-  
 s) - (1 - t) B L = 0 - 33 -
(III.40) -  
 L u´(W- 
 s) + L u´[s L/(M-L)] = 0 
Using (III.40) we get (III.24). As in the monopoly union solution, inequalities 
(II.25) and (II.26) hold. 
From (III.39) and (III.24) we get that 
(III.41) u´(W-  
 s) = (1 - t) B = u´(b) / 

A rise in t will coincide with an increase in employed members welfare. And the 
lower 
, (the lower u´(b)) the higher b*. 
Ex-post, the budget constraint (III.36) will hold. Then: 
(III.42) u´(W-  
 s) = B {1 - [s (1 - 
) L / (P F(L) - W L)]}  
2. Or the firms recognize (III.36). Then it is easy to show that we have a similar 
situation to the earnings tax problem. 
Proposition 5. If the unemployment compensation expenses are split between 
workers and firms and the budget constraint is recognized by both (as in an earnings or 
employment tax, or profit taxes on and recognized by the firm as derived from the budget 
constraint), unions being able to control the size of the unemployment compensation: 
1. Employment, unemployment compensation and the after-tax wage is invariant 
to the way the expenses are split if taxes paid by firms are proportional to employment. 
2. (Before-tax) wages vary positively with the proportion of taxes paid by 
workers. 
Proposition 6. If the unemployment compensation expenses are split between 
workers and firms, unions being able to control the size of the unemployment 
compensation, provided that labor demand is independent of the way expenses are financed 
(e.g., in the case of lump-sum or profit taxes on and not recognized by the firm as 
associated to the budget constraint), and for the case of a utilitarian union, for both the 
monopoly union and efficient bargaining solution: 
1. the utility of working members will be lower than of those unemployed.  
2. the wage-unemployment benefit trade-off will favor workers relative to the case 
of Proposition 5.- 35 -
IV. Summary and Conclusions.
This paper gathers some notes on the introduction of the possibility of internal 
compensation to unemployed members. 
1. As expected, the fact that such mechanism is in place - or employed members 
realize they must be taxed in order to pay for the unemployment benefit - leads to lower 
monopoly union gross wages than if we considered otherwise. With efficient bargaining, 
we may have an outward shift of the contract curve with the recognition of the budget 
constraint by the union. 
The comparison of endogenous and exogenous (but recognized by the union) 
unemployment benefit cases depends upon the size of the unemployment compensation. 
For instance, if a monopoly union prefers a higher unemployment benefit than the 
government sets, then, if allowed to raise it, it will require a higher wage level and increase 
unemployment. 
2. Utilitarian unions that control the unemployment benefit choose the outcome of 
wage bill - or, in some cases, collective rent - maximizer union. This will also be the case if 
unions can control membership. As noted before in the literature, employed and 
unemployed members will have the same utility. 
If the budget constraint is not recognized by the utilitarian union, then unemployed 
members will be worse-off than employed members - both in monopoly union as in 
efficient bargaining solution. 
3. Monopoly unions that recognize the budget constraint, as they gain control over 
coverage or membership, are expected to raise wages when decreasing coverage. Monopoly 
unions that can decide coverage (membership) and become aware of the budget constraint 
will lower membership. 
If the union’s utility function has an utilitarian part and an additional argument 
depending only on union membership, provided this is concave, if the union can decide 
membership, we expect to observe that the unemployment benefit increases with union size 
or membership. In efficient bargaining, both will decrease with the employers´ relative 
strength.
4. If the unemployment benefit bill is split between unions and firms, as long as 
they recognize the budget constraint, the labor market outcome remains (in net wages and - 36 -
employment) unaffected relative to the case where union (working) members pay the 
unemployment benefit bill in full.  
5. If the unemployment benefit bill is split between unions and firms and the 
budget constraint is not recognized by the firm, working members of a utilitarian union will 
be worse-off than unemployed ones. The wage-unemployment benefit trade-off will favor 
workers relative to the previous case.  - 37 -
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